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The authors of this Article review the current state of the science of attribu-
tion of anthropogenic climate change, with particular emphasis on the meth-
odological challenges that are likely to confront any attempt to establish a direct 
causal link between greenhouse gas emissions and specific damaging weather 
events.  Standard “detection and attribution” analyses, such as those cited by 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), are generally suffi-
cient to establish the strength of human influence on large-scale, long-term-
average climate, but fall short of quantifying the role of greenhouse gas emis-
sions in almost any conceivable case of actual harm, since nobody is directly 
exposed to a change in global average temperature alone.  The authors argue 
that it should be possible to agree on a relatively objective approach to quantify-
ing the role of human influence on climate in cases of actual harm.  There are, 
however, a number of questions to be resolved, including:  can we apply the 
concept of Fraction Attributable Risk, developed for population studies in epi-
demiology, to the analysis of an unprecedented change in a single system such 
as the world’s climate?  Can we rely on computer simulation to address counter-
factual questions such as “what would the climate have been like in the absence 
of twentieth century greenhouse gas emissions,” given that we are working with 
imperfect simulation models?  Due to multiple anthropogenic and natural con-
tributions to changing weather risks, it will always be necessary to apply some 
kind of principle of ceteris paribus to quantify the role of any particular causal 
agent, such as greenhouse gas emissions.  How is this principle to be applied?  
These questions are not, in themselves, scientific issues, although how they are 
to be resolved will have a direct bearing on how and whether climate science can 
inform specific causal attribution claims.  In summary, we need the legal com-
munity to ask the scientific community the right questions.  It is imperative that 
these issues be resolved as soon as possible, to avoid having them become en-
twined in the outcomes of specific cases.  Thus, this Article serves as a kind of 
tutorial, going over some material that many will find familiar in order to 
place it in the context of attribution. 
I.  INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION:   
WHY LAWYERS NEED TO UNDERSTAND THIS STUFF 
In addressing a crowd of lawyers, the first and overarching chal-
lenge for a physicist is to keep the audience awake.  This is particularly 
pertinent when the topic is climate change, because many in the legal 
community may feel that the methodological details of causal attribu-
tion are of academic interest only.  When and if cases ever come to 
court claiming that actual or imminent harm is attributable to human 
influence on climate, this argument runs, competing sides will invite 
experts to testify for and against some assertion like “past greenhouse 
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gas emissions contributed substantially to harmful weather event X,” 
and cases will be decided on the basis of the credibility and qualifica-
tions of the relevant experts.  Hence lawyers do not need to trouble 
themselves with the details; they simply need to line up authoritative 
expert witnesses. 
We would argue that such heavy reliance on expert testimony is 
both unnecessary and counterproductive.  It is unnecessary because it 
should be possible to agree on a standard method for the attribution 
of harm to human influence on climate, such that results do not de-
pend, at least as a first approximation, on the prior opinions of the 
scientists responsible for making the assessment.  If the legal commu-
nity demands it, the meteorological “raw material” for any assessment 
of harm could be provided by a straightforward extension of routine 
weather forecasting services, generated by the same neutral govern-
ment agencies that currently provide forecasts.  Expert judgment will 
naturally still be required for the interpretation of this material in any 
particular case, but, except in the most marginal situations, this reli-
ance on expert judgment can be minimized if we can agree on an “in-
dustry standard” operational approach to the attribution problem, 
such as the one we advocate here. 
Heavy reliance on expert testimony in causal attribution claims is 
also likely to be counterproductive.  First, there is considerable room 
for confusion over what expert testimony actually means.  For exam-
ple, we would all subscribe to the following two statements:  “human 
influence on climate played a substantial role in causing the European 
heat wave of 2003”; and “it is impossible in principle to attribute any 
single weather event to human influence on climate.”  To a layperson, 
these statements appear contradictory.  They only make sense if it is 
understood that “causing” an event in the first statement must be in-
terpreted as “contributing to the risk of” that event occurring, while 
the second statement is only true if we interpret “attribute” narrowly 
as “were it not for human influence, this event would not have oc-
curred.”  Hence the legal community cannot expect the scientific 
community to do its job for it:  it will always be possible for both sides 
in a case to persuade experts (and possibly even the same expert) to 
subscribe to statements that sound as if they support their cause.  Ex-
pert testimony thus will only be useful if the scientific context is un-
derstood. 
Overreliance on expert testimony is also likely to have a damaging 
impact on the scientific community.  We do not have to look very far 
for an example of the damage that can be caused by personalizing sci-
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entific debate.  Some critics of the Mann et al. reconstruction of 
Northern Hemisphere temperatures over the past millennium,1 as 
cited by the 2001 Scientific Assessment of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),2 have made a sustained effort to di-
vert the debate from methodological issues of paleoclimate recon-
struction to procedural issues and ad hominem attacks over what 
source code was available when, how the reconstruction came to be 
cited by the IPCC, and so forth.3  Scientific research will rapidly be-
come impossible if individual researchers have to operate under the 
threat of their research software being subpoenaed or if scientific 
statements must be individually scrutinized for their potential legal 
implications. 
The only way to avoid this (scientists’) nightmare scenario is to 
operationalize the attribution problem now, which must include the 
development of an agreed approach to incorporating new research 
into the attribution procedure.  Any operational attribution proce-
dure will always tend to be somewhat behind front-line research, 
whereas the “latest” research results tend, by their very nature, to be 
relatively unreliable until they have been fully digested by the scien-
tific community.  For this reason, weather forecasters are typically con-
servative about incorporating new research into their forecast models; 
they generally require some demonstration that an innovation will 
demonstrably improve forecast skill before making such a change.  
Demonstrating that an innovation—such as an improved model or a 
new reconstruction of solar variability—will improve the accuracy of 
attribution statements is clearly more problematic, however, because 
we do not have a sequence of cases on which to test out the impact of 
the innovation as the weather forecasters do. 
Popular discussions of the climate issue often give the impression 
that the whole science of attribution has to return to square one 
whenever a new feedback process is identified or a new solar recon-
struction is published.  This would obviously make life impossible for 
1 Michael E. Mann et al., Global-Scale Temperature Patterns and Climate Forcing over the 
Past Six Centuries, 392 NATURE 779 (1998). 
2 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, WORKING GROUP I, CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2001:  THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS  99, 133-36 ( J .T. Houghton et al. eds., 2001) 
[hereinafter SCIENTIFIC BASIS].  This assessment summarized, discussed, and high-
lighted the reconstruction from Mann et al., supra note 1. 
3 See, e.g., Letter from Joe Barton and Ed Whitfield, Chairmen, Subcomm. on 
Oversight Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, to Michael Mann, 
June 23, 2006, available at http://republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/ 
108/Letters/062305_Mann.pdf. 
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the legal community because new research papers that might poten-
tially have some bearing on attribution claims will always be coming 
out.  Nevertheless, we believe it should be possible to agree on a 
methodology for deciding to what extent new research results refute 
past attribution claims, and by applying the same standards, to agree 
on whether or not the current version of the operational attribution 
system is good enough to be applied to specific questions. 
To conclude this introduction, we stress that this review is focus-
ing exclusively on the meteorological attribution problem:  to what 
extent human influence on climate can be “blamed” for observed 
weather trends and specific weather events such as floods, storms, or 
heat waves.  We will not be addressing the equally important problem 
of how other factors, such as decisions to build in vulnerable locations 
or to maintain coastal defenses, as well as offering health services, can 
contribute to or mitigate actual losses, nor how these losses are them-
selves related to meteorological variables.  We believe that these ques-
tions can be considered separately because only in very exceptional 
cases (such as the carbon released by large-scale regional deforesta-
tion) will there be any significant feedback between local decisions af-
fecting vulnerability to weather and global changes affecting the 
weather itself. 
II.  “CLASSICAL” DETECTION AND ATTRIBUTION:  THE EVIDENCE FOR 
HUMAN INFLUENCE ON GLOBAL CLIMATE 
The aim of this section is to outline the principles behind the 
standard approach to detecting and attributing human influence on 
global and regional climate as they are used by the scientific commu-
nity to provide the basis for successive IPCC Scientific Assessments.4  
We will avoid methodological details, and instead focus on clarifying 
the precise question that is being asked in conventional detection and 
attribution studies and the assumptions underlying their answers in 
order to highlight issues that might prove contentious if these studies 
are ever used in any legal action. 
Detection and attribution studies have traditionally focused on 
large-scale, long-term changes in variables such as seasonal or annual 
mean surface temperature.5  Changes in such metrics do relatively lit-
4 See SCIENTIFIC BASIS, supra note 2, at 695, 700-13 (explaining the history and 
elements of climate change detection and attribution). 
5 For examples and reviews of such studies, see Myles R. Allen et al., Quantifying 
Anthropogenic Influence on Recent Near-Surface Temperature Change, 27 SURVS. GEOPHYSICS 
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tle damage in and of themselves, but these studies provide the overall 
basis for any attempt to focus on more impact-relevant variables such 
as sea level, so it is important that they are fully understood. 
The scientific context for global-scale detection and attribution 
studies is illustrated by Figure 1,6 which is modeled after the recent 
analysis by Stott et al.7  Panel (a) compares global mean temperatures 
simulated by a range of climate models driven by a combination of 
human and natural influences (thin gray lines), with observed 
changes in global temperature over the twentieth century (heavy 
black line).  Panel (b) compares the same quantity with simulations of 
a subset of the models shown in panel (a) driven by natural influences 
alone.8  The most important anthropogenic driver of climate change 
over the period included in these model simulations is the increase in 
“well-mixed” greenhouse gases (GHGs) (so called because these gases 
have relatively long lifetimes and mix relatively homogeneously 
through the atmosphere):  predominantly carbon dioxide, methane, 
nitrous oxide, and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). 
For a first approximation, the climatic impact of well-mixed GHGs 
can be evaluated by considering them as a single global driver of cli-
mate change, with the contribution of any individual gas at any given 
time being proportional to its “radiative forcing,” or the change in the 
overall balance of incoming and outgoing energy evaluated over the 
whole planet that would result from resetting the concentration of 
that gas back to its preindustrial value.  More generally, the scientific 
community refers to external drivers of climate change as “climate 
forcings” or “climate forcing factors” whose magnitudes are conven-
tionally compared with respect to their impact on the global energy 
budget.  There are complications, in that the impact on the energy 
budget of a given increase in the two most important well-mixed 
GHGs, carbon dioxide and methane, is affected by the composition of 
the atmosphere, which is itself changing.  The immediate impact on 
the global energy budget of a ton of carbon dioxide released today is 
491 (2006); Peter A. Stott, Attribution of Regional-Scale Temperature Changes to Anthropo-
genic and Natural Causes, GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS, July 16, 2003, at 2-1; and Simon 
F.B. Tett et al., Causes of Twentieth-Century Temperature Change Near the Earth’s Surface, 399 
NATURE 569 (1999). 
 6 All figures are found in the Appendix, infra. 
7 Peter A. Stott et al., Observational Constraints on Past Attributable Warming and Pre-
dictions of Future Global Warming, 19 J. CLIMATE 3055 (2006). 
8 At the time of writing, not all modeling groups have completed these natural-
only simulations. 
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only about 73% of the impact that ton would have had if it had been 
released into a preindustrial atmosphere because carbon dioxide lev-
els have already increased by almost 40%.  The impact of any methane 
increase also depends on current carbon dioxide concentrations.9
These interactions mean that some agreed interpretation of the 
ceteris paribus principle is necessary even to work out the simplest cli-
matic impact of any anthropogenic change in GHG levels.  Within the 
scientific community, the usual approach to comparing the impact of 
two GHG emissions (a ton of carbon dioxide versus a ton of methane, 
both emitted today, for example) is to consider the impact on the 
global energy budget, integrated over some agreed time scale, of not 
emitting each one under an agreed, relatively realistic, scenario for 
the evolution of all other gases.  Rather than considering how inject-
ing a given amount of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere would 
have disturbed the preindustrial climate, we ask how not injecting that 
amount of carbon dioxide would alter our present-day and projected 
future climate. 
The impacts of the other main anthropogenic drivers of climate 
change depend much more heavily on location, season, and even lo-
cal weather conditions, making them much harder to sum up in terms 
of a global radiative forcing.  These drivers include the aerosols that 
are generated primarily by sulfur emissions from power stations and 
industrial processes.  These have a cooling effect on climate, both di-
rectly—by reflecting incoming sunlight—and indirectly—through 
their influence on cloud amount and cloud properties.  Stratospheric 
ozone depletion (due to CFCs) and tropospheric (near-surface) 
ozone increase (primarily due to exhaust gases from hot combustion 
processes, such as vehicle engines) also have an impact on regional 
climate, although, averaged over the whole globe, their impact ap-
pears to be small relative to that of the well-mixed GHGs.10  Finally, 
changes in land use, which have been included in only some of the 
9 For an accessible review, see Keith P. Shine & Piers M. de F. Forster, The Effect of 
Human Activity on Radiative Forcing of Climate Change:  A Review of Recent Developments, 20 
GLOBAL & PLANETARY CHANGE 205 (1999). 
10 See G.C. Hegerl et al., Multi-Fingerprint Detection and Attribution of Greenhouse Gas, 
Greenhouse Gas-Plus-Aerosol and Solar Forced Climate Change, 13 CLIMATE DYNAMICS 613, 
628 (1997) (observing that aerosol-induced cooling is likely to occur primarily in the 
mid-latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere); V. Ramanathan et al., Aerosols, Climate, and 
the Hydrological Cycle. 294 SCIENCE 2119, 2123 (2001) (suggesting that the cooling effect 
of sulfate aerosols will manifest itself primarily in the tropics and subtropics, while the 
effects of GHGs will be most pronounced in the Southern Hemisphere and high lati-
tudes). 
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model simulations performed to date, can have a highly significant 
impact on local climate, although their impact on global climate and 
on regions remote from the land-use change also appears to be rela-
tively small. 
The two natural drivers of climate change included in the model 
simulations shown in Figure 1 are changes in the power output of the 
sun and aerosols injected into the stratosphere by explosive volcanic 
eruptions.  Solar activity varies naturally over the well-documented 
eleven-year “sunspot cycle,” but variations on longer time scales are 
much more controversial.11  The problem is that we only have direct 
observations of solar output over the past two and a half eleven-year 
cycles, over which period it is impossible to discern any clear back-
ground trend.  Efforts have been made to reconstruct solar variations 
over the past few centuries using, for example, observations of geo-
magnetic activity and analogs based on observations of sun-like stars.  
All of these reconstructions suffer from a calibration problem:  they 
tend to be much more confident about the overall shape of recent 
changes in solar activity (with activity reaching a minimum around the 
time of the “Maunder minimum” in the seventeenth century) than 
they are about the size of these changes.12  Estimates of the change in 
solar power output between the Maunder minimum and today vary by 
almost an order of magnitude between studies.13  This problem, which 
also applies to reconstructions of the impact of explosive volcanos, has 
a direct impact on the techniques used for climate change detection 
and attribution.14
11 Compare Judith Lean et al., Reconstruction of Solar Irradiance Since 1610:  Implica-
tions for Climate Change, GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS, Dec. 1, 1995, at 3195 (concluding 
that approximately half of the global warming observed since 1860, but less than one-
third of the warming since 1970, can be attributed to solar activity), with Douglas V. 
Hoyt & Kenneth H. Schatten, A Discussion of Plausible Solar Irradiance Variations, 1700-
1992, 98 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. 18,895, 18,904 (1993) (positing that 71% of the warming 
that has occurred since 1891 can be attributed to fluctuations in solar irradiance).  Ju-
dith Lean and David Rind, in Evaluating Sun-Climate Relationships Since the Little Ice Age, 
61 J. ATMOSPHERIC & SOLAR-TERRESTRIAL PHYSICS  25, 25 (1999), summarize as follows:  
“while solar variability likely played a dominant role in modulating climate during the 
Little Ice Age prior to 1850, its influence since 1900 has become an increasingly less 
significant component of climate change.” 
12 For a review, see Judith Lean, Living with a Variable Sun, PHYSICS TODAY, June 
2005, at 32, 35-37. 
13 See supra note 11 (comparing the conflicting studies by Lean et al. and Hoyt and 
Schatten). 
14 See Natalia G. Andronova et al., Radiative Forcing by Volcanic Aerosols from 1850 to 
1994, 104 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES., 16,807, 16,808 tbl.1 (1999) (noting that recent observa-
tions of radiative forcing by Mount Pinatubo, the most intensively studied volcanic 
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Inspecting Figure 1, we might be tempted to conclude naïvely that 
around 0.6oC of warming over the past fifty years is unambiguously at-
tributable to human influence on climate.  The detection and attribu-
tion community has traditionally been more cautious than this, how-
ever, not accepting universal agreement among models as sufficient 
evidence for an attribution claim.15  The first reason for this caution is 
that all of these models are driven by similar forcing datasets, and 
hence might share a common error in, for example, the amplitude of 
low-frequency solar variations. 
The second reason for caution is that, at least until recently, the 
community has been reluctant to treat the range of responses from 
available models as spanning the range of responses that could be tak-
ing place in the real world.  Hence, so this argument goes, if all mod-
els display a consistent warming of at least 0.5oC due to anthropogenic 
influence, this could result from a common error that all models 
share, and the real-world response (or the response of the next gen-
eration of models) could be significantly smaller than 0.5oC.  There is 
considerable debate over the extent to which currently available mod-
els span the range of plausible real-world responses.  Indeed, given 
current estimates of uncertainty in both climate forcing factors and 
response, it might well be argued that the near-universal agreement 
between models and observations in Figure 1 is evidence that the 
spread of model-simulated responses is too small to span the current 
range of uncertainty.  To some extent, this is to be expected because 
each of the modeling groups contributing simulations to the compari-
son shown in Figure 1 was aiming to provide a “best estimate” of the 
response to “best estimate” forcing; no systematic effort was made to 
explore low and high values of either forcing or response.16
We have tended, as has most of the detection and attribution 
community, to take a relatively skeptical stance on the issue of 
whether current models span the range of plausible real-world re-
sponses.  In a review of this nature, however, it is important to note 
eruption as of 1999, yield an uncertainty of greater than 100%); Gabriele C. Hegerl et 
al., Detection of Volcanic, Solar and Greenhouse Gas Signals in Paleo-Reconstructions of North-
ern Hemispheric Temperature, GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS, Mar. 12, 2003, at 46-1, 46-3 (es-
timating the uncertainty of their proxy reconstruction of volcanic forcing at approxi-
mately 50%). 
15 See the discussion of detection and attribution methods in Mitchell et al., supra 
note 4, at 700-13. 
16 See, e.g., Myles R. Allen et al., Model Error in Weather and Climate Forecasting, in  
PREDICTABILITY OF WEATHER AND CLIMATE 391, 403 fig.15.1 (Tim Palmer & Renate 
Hagedorn eds., 2006). 
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that there are other researchers who would regard the agreement be-
tween the models displayed in Figure 1 as itself sufficient evidence to 
attribute a substantial fraction of the warming that has occurred over 
the twentieth century to the anthropogenic increase in GHG levels.  
Fortunately for nonspecialists, formal detection and attribution stud-
ies that avoid assuming that the models give the correct magnitude of 
the response to anthropogenic or natural forcing appear to be con-
verging on a very similar conclusion to that suggested by a naïve in-
terpretation of Figure 1.  This appears to be a case in which first im-
pressions turn out, in fact, to be remarkably accurate.17
III.  WHAT IS THE “NATURAL” CLIMATE? 
Before we discuss how formal detection and attribution studies 
work, we can use Figure 1 to illustrate a point of principle that the le-
gal community will need to resolve before making use of these studies’ 
results.  This is the question of what we mean by ceteris paribus in the 
context of climate change:  what is the “natural” climate against which 
we are comparing present-day and future conditions to assess the ex-
tent of human influence?  At a global level, the combined effect of so-
lar and volcanic forcing appears to have been to induce a modest 
(0.1oC or so) cooling over the second half of the twentieth century, so 
some of the anthropogenic warming to date has been compensating 
for this natural cooling.18  Suppose that a plaintiff were to argue that 
she was being harmed by high temperatures.19  Is human influence “to 
blame” for the full 0.6oC of warming or only the 0.5oC that is not com-
pensating for natural cooling?  Given that we have no a priori reason 
to believe that natural forcing would induce cooling rather than 
warming over this period, one might even argue that human influ-
ence can only be blamed for the warming that could not have oc-
curred naturally, giving an even smaller figure. 
17 See Int’l Ad Hoc Detection & Attribution Group, Detecting and Attributing External 
Influences on the Climate System:  A Review of Recent Advances, 18 J. CLIMATE 1291, 1298-99 
(2005) (reviewing the literature and noting that the Allen study, supra note 5, which 
deliberately excluded global mean temperature information as a sensitivity study, 
nonetheless found a GHG signal). 
18 See Theodore L. Anderson et al., Climate Forcing by Aerosols:  A Hazy Picture, 300 
SCIENCE 1103, 1103-04 (2003) (suggesting that the impact of aerosol cooling may 
largely compensate for present greenhouse warming, but concluding that greenhouse 
warming will exceed aerosol cooling effects in the twenty-first century). 
19 This is a hypothetical example, because nobody is directly harmed by global 
mean temperature itself, but it serves to illustrate the point of principle. 
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The problem with this line of argument is that while we are rela-
tively uncertain about the actual magnitude of past natural drivers of 
climate change, we are even more uncertain about the impact of these 
drivers, given our limited knowledge of the mechanisms governing 
low-frequency variability in either solar activity or explosive volcanism.  
Solar and volcanic activity appear to have caused a cooling over the 
second half of the twentieth century:  how much warming might have 
occurred if the sun had behaved differently and volcanos had gone off 
at different times?  This would be a very difficult question to answer, 
so it is to be hoped that the legal community will be satisfied with a 
much more restrictive interpretation of ceteris paribus, under which 
the impact of any given driver of climate change is measured by how 
the climate would be different if that driver were absent, assuming all 
other drivers of climate change evolved as observed. 
This is the interpretation of attribution used by the scientific 
community:  when we assess how much warming has been caused by 
GHGs over the past fifty years, we include in that figure the avoided 
cooling that would have been caused by other factors had it not been 
masked by this greenhouse warming.  The key reason for this is that 
the question of how the climate would have been different if the 
GHG-induced warming had not occurred but all other drivers of cli-
mate change evolved as they did is scientifically well posed.  The ques-
tion of how the climate might have been had nothing changed since 
preindustrial times is not well posed, however, since we have no obser-
vations of such a hypothetical stationary climate and very little data on 
either the preindustrial climate itself or the factors driving it. 
The issue of “what is a natural climate” has a direct bearing on the 
relevance to current attribution claims of paleoclimate reconstruc-
tions of the climate of the last millennium.  If attribution is evaluated 
relative to a preindustrial climate, then the questions of what that pre-
industrial climate was and how much it varied naturally become cru-
cial.  The problem is that reconstructions of preindustrial climate and 
preindustrial solar and volcanic activity are necessarily based on indi-
rect (“proxy”) observations that appear, at least at present, to be much 
more open to reinterpretation than the direct observations of climate 
over the past century.20  Instrumental observations are also open to 
20 The controversy surrounding the accuracy of such reconstructions has become 
known as the “hockey stick” debate, reflecting the shape of the graph proposed in 
Mann et al., supra note 1, at 783 fig.5b.  For a criticism of Mann’s work, see Stephen 
McIntyre & Ross McKitrick, Hockey Sticks, Principal Components, and Spurious Significance, 
GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS, Feb. 12, 2005, at L03710, L03710-2 (finding that applying 
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challenge, as we have seen in the debate over the Microwave Sound-
ing Unit record,21 but there is much more information available to re-
solve contentious issues. 
Figure 2, from Hegerl et al.,22 illustrates how much disagreement 
exists about the earth’s climate during preindustrial times.  It shows a 
number of reconstructions of temperatures in the Northern Hemi-
sphere over the past millennium relative to their mid-twentieth-
century values.  There are clearly pronounced differences between the 
reconstructions regarding how cold temperatures were in the so-
called “Little Ice Age” around the seventeenth century.  Likewise, 
there is even less agreement about whether temperatures were 
warmer than today during the “Medieval Warm Period” around the 
eleventh century.  This level of disagreement is unsurprising given 
that all of these reconstructions are attempting to estimate a global or 
hemispheric temperature from a limited number of indirect observa-
tions, such as tree-ring widths, that provide, at best, an indication of 
local temperatures over a particular season. 
The situation is even more problematic when we consider that 
harm, in almost all instances, will depend on centennial climatic 
trends as well as on absolute climate, and also on variables other than 
large-scale temperatures.  If a plaintiff were to argue that she had 
been dispossessed because an increase in heat-wave risk had rendered 
her village uninhabitable, she would have to explain why she was there 
in the first place.  After all, there are locations which have always been 
effectively uninhabitable because of heat waves.  The issue is thus not 
the absolute climate, but the climate relative to that which a plaintiff 
might reasonably have expected to experience when she invested in 
the region.  Estimating the range of past centennial temperature 
trends may prove even more difficult than estimating past tempera-
tures themselves and very few studies have even begun to address the 
problem of reconstructing centennial fluctuations in other variables, 
such as precipitation.23
Mann’s methodology to red noise often produces similar, hockey-stick-shaped graphs). 
21 For a comprehensive discussion of this debate and how it appears to have been 
resolved, see U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, TEMPERATURE TRENDS IN THE 
LOWER ATMOSPHERE:  STEPS FOR UNDERSTANDING AND RECONCILING DIFFERENCES 56-
58 (2006), avai lab l e  a t  ht tp://www.cl imatescience.gov/Library/sap/ 
sap1-1/finalreport/sap1-1-final-all.pdf. 
22 Gabriele C. Hegerl et al., Climate Sensitivity Constrained by Temperature Reconstruc-
tions over the Past Seven Centuries, 440 NATURE 1029, 1030 fig.2 (2006). 
23 For additional information, see the discussion of attribution results in non-
temperature variables (or scarcity thereof) in chapter 9 of IPCC, WORKING GROUP I, 
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Hence, if the question of attribution of current temperature 
trends were dependent on our knowledge of climatic trends prior to 
the Medieval Warm Period, it is unlikely to be resolved in the foresee-
able future.  Fortunately, it does not, provided that the legal commu-
nity accepts the restrictive definition of ceteris paribus used by the sci-
entific detection and attribution community.  As far as we can tell, 
most of these preindustrial fluctuations in climate were externally 
driven.  Figure 2, for example, compares these paleoclimate recon-
structions with simulated hemispheric temperatures from a simple 
climate model driven by estimated volcanic activity, solar variability, 
and anthropogenic influences over the past millennium.  Cold peri-
ods in the seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries are reproduced 
by the model, in both cases largely driven by an increase in volcanic 
activity, while the Medieval Warm Period appears to have been caused 
by a temporary reduction in volcanic activity, possibly with some con-
tribution from solar variability. 
Given that these large-scale warming and cooling trends observed 
in Figure 2 appear to be externally driven, if the second half of the 
twentieth century had been characterized by a substantial increase in 
solar activity and a decrease in volcanic activity then we might have 
seen a natural warming trend comparable to that observed over the 
past fifty years.  But this is irrelevant to the attribution of recent warm-
ing trends, because we can be reasonably confident that neither natu-
ral forcing occurred.  The mid-twentieth century was a relatively qui-
escent period for volcanic activity followed by three major eruptions—
Agung in 1963, El Chichón in 1982, and Pinatubo in 1991—giving a 
significant net volcanic cooling trend over the period from 1950 to 
2000.  On time scales longer than the eleven-year solar cycle, solar 
output has been relatively constant throughout this period, so the net 
effect of natural drivers has been to induce the cooling trend ob-
served in the “natural” simulations in Figure 1. 
Even if the ambiguities of paleoclimate reconstruction could be 
resolved, there is also the question of arbitrariness:  should we define 
“preindustrial climate” as that of the past 700 years—in which case all 
experts agree that current global temperatures are probably unprece-
dented—the past 1000 years (in which case there would be more dis-
agreement)—or the past 5000 years (which very likely contain periods 
warmer than the present day due to changes in the configuration of 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:  THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (2007) [hereinafter PHYSICAL 
SCIENCE BASIS]. 
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the Earth’s orbit).  One might argue that the conditions in the seven-
teenth century are more relevant because predictable factors affecting 
climate, specifically orbital forcing—were then close to their present-
day values.  But this suggests that the real question in which we are in-
terested is not, in fact, preindustrial climate at all, but the climate that 
would have prevailed today in the absence of human influence.  If we 
require orbital forcing to take near-present-day values, then why not 
volcanic forcing and so on, which brings us back to the more restric-
tive interpretation of ceteris paribus used by the detection and attribu-
tion community. 
We highlight this issue for two reasons.  First, the debate over re-
constructions of the climate of the past millennium is frequently cited 
as evidence that important issues regarding the attribution of human 
influence on climate remain unresolved.  In fact, it has relatively little 
relevance to the question of causal attribution of changes over the 
past half century because much stronger evidence is available for this 
period in the form of instrumental observations and detailed model 
simulations.  If future research were to conclude that the eleventh 
century was indeed warmer than the present day, the simplest expla-
nation would be that the net impact of increased solar and reduced 
volcanic activity on eleventh century temperatures was larger than our 
current best estimates of these climate drivers indicate.  Since these 
estimates are already highly uncertain, such a revision would be un-
surprising and would have very little impact on our estimates of the 
impact of natural drivers of climate on recent decades, for which we 
have much more information.  Millennial temperature reconstruc-
tions are useful as a means of checking model-simulated climate vari-
ability on centennial time scales, a test which current models typically 
pass, but their role is supplementary and is not the primary focus of 
attention. 
The second reason we highlight this issue is that this is an inter-
disciplinary Article, and we recognize that the legal community might 
take a different view from our own on the appropriate reference point 
to use when defining climate change.  The advantage of defining 
changes relative to the climate of the sixteenth through nineteenth 
centuries, for example, is that we would then be focusing on “refer-
ence conditions” that actually occurred, even though they can only be 
observed indirectly.  The alternative that the scientific community 
uses, is to define our reference conditions as the climate that would 
have occurred in the early twenty-first century in the absence of spe-
cific human influences.  However, these conditions can only be ex-
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plored through computer simulation.  Hence, this is the first question 
that we would like the legal community to resolve:  what is the appro-
priate baseline against which to quantify human influence on climate?  
If it is acceptable to define this baseline or reference climate as that 
which would have occurred either today or in the future in the ab-
sence of human influence, the entire “hockey stick” debate becomes 
largely irrelevant; the fact that volcanos may have been anomalously 
quiet in the eleventh century, resulting in a temporary upturn in tem-
peratures, plays no direct role in our understanding of the causes of 
climate change over the past half century.  The ceteris paribus issue 
will come up again in the discussion of quantifying the role of human 
influence in cases of actual harm. 
IV.  QUANTIFYING HUMAN INFLUENCE 
Allowing for uncertainty in model-simulated reponses to both 
human and natural external drivers, how do formal detection and at-
tribution studies assess how much human influence has contributed to 
the warming observed in Figure 1?  The standard approach, first set 
out by Hasselmann,24 and implemented by Santer et al.25 and Hegerl 
et al.,26 is generally known as “optimal fingerprinting.”  It is essentially 
nothing more than a form of linear regression and assumes that mod-
els provide the correct pattern of response in both space and time to a 
given external driver, such as increasing GHGs or explosive volcanic 
activity, while allowing for the possibility that they may err on the 
magnitude of the response.27
24 See generally K. Hasselmann, Multi-Pattern Fingerprint Method for Detection and Attri-
bution of Climate Change, 13 CLIMATE DYNAMICS 601, 610 (1997) (extending the “opti-
mal fingerprint” method to multiple competing explanations of climate change); K. 
Hasselmann, Optimal Fingerprints for the Detection of Time-Dependent Climate Change, 6 J. 
CLIMATE 1957 (1993) (proposing the “optimal fingerprint” method). 
25 See Benjamin D. Santer et al., Ocean Variability and Its Influence on the Detectability 
of Greenhouse Warming Signals, 100 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. (OCEANS) 10,693-10,725 (1995) 
(applying Hasselmann’s method to ocean model temperatures). 
26 See Gabriele C. Hegerl et al., Detecting Greenhouse-Gas-Induced Climate Change with 
an Optimal Fingerprint Method, 9 J. CLIMATE 2281 (1996) (applying Hasselmann’s 
method to surface temperatures). 
27 See Stephen S. Leroy, Detecting Climate Signals:  Some Bayesian Aspects, 11 J. CLI-
MATE 640, 643 (1998) (demonstrating how the fingerprinting approach fits into con-
ventional Bayesian estimation theory); M.R. Allen & S.F.B. Tett, Checking for Model Con-
sistency in Optimal Fingerprinting, 15 CLIMATE DYNAMICS 419 (1999) (arguing that fin-
gerprinting should only be used in conjunction with checks on model-simulated 
internal variability to avoid spurious detection claims). 
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There are sound physical reasons to believe that model-simulated 
response patterns are more likely to be correct than simulated re-
sponse magnitudes.  The timing of explosive volcanic eruptions and 
their relative magnitude in terms of potential climatic impact, for ex-
ample, are relatively well known, while the absolute amount of reflec-
tive material injected into the stratosphere, how long it stayed there, 
and the net cooling effect on climate are much more ambiguous, even 
for recent volcanos.28  Likewise, different reconstructions of past solar 
activity agree on the overall timing of increases and decreases in solar 
output while differing substantially on their magnitude.29
The spatial pattern of response to global climatic drivers such as 
solar activity and increasingly well-mixed GHGs is primarily deter-
mined by the different heat capacities of land and ocean, and there-
fore causes land temperatures to respond to both warming and cool-
ing much faster than sea surface temperatures.  The positive feedback 
effect of melting snow and ice also causes high-latitude temperatures 
to change more than tropical temperatures.  Again, these are well-
understood processes that are replicated in all plausible climate mod-
els. 
Responses can also be differentiated by their vertical structure:  an 
increase in well-mixed GHGs tends to cause warming in the tropo-
sphere and cooling in the lower stratosphere.  By contrast, an increase 
in solar activity causes warming over the full depth of the atmosphere 
away from the poles.  Volcanos warm the stratosphere and cool the 
surface and troposphere.  Again, all of these features of the responses 
to different drivers are well understood and generally accepted across 
the scientific community. 
The spatial patterns of response to spatially heterogenous drivers 
such as anthropogenic and volcanic aerosols are less well established, 
although it is generally accepted that anthropogenic aerosols have a 
much larger impact on temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere, 
where most aerosol sources are located, than in the Southern Hemi-
sphere.  The key uncertainty in the spatial pattern of response to vol-
canic eruptions is due to the dynamic response of the atmosphere, 
28 See, e.g., Alan Robock, Volcanic Eruptions and Climate, 38 REV. GEOPHYSICS 191, 
214 (2000) (discussing the ability of current climate models to simulate the response 
to large volcanic eruptions). 
29 Hoyt & Schatten, supra note 11, at 18,897-18,901 figs.1-7; Lean et al., supra note 
11, at 3196-97 figs.1-4. 
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which may not be accurately simulated by relatively low-resolution 
climate models.30
The time history of anthropogenic aerosol influence on climate is 
much better understood than its spatial structure and, crucially, is dis-
tinct from the time history of the influence of anthropogenic GHGs, 
even though both GHG emissions and aerosol emissions are closely 
related to industrialization.  The reason is that the dominant GHG, 
carbon dioxide, accumulates in the atmosphere, so its influence de-
pends on cumulative emissions over the past century or so.  In con-
trast, anthropogenic aerosols are “washed out” by precipitation on a 
time scale of only a few days, so their influence depends on current 
emissions rather than on cumulative emissions.  Over the past few 
decades, improved power generation systems have also substantially 
reduced the aerosol burden that accompanies a given level of carbon 
dioxide emissions.31
The net effect of these factors, all of which are relatively noncon-
tentious, is that aerosol cooling increased rapidly until the mid-1970s, 
more than offsetting greenhouse warming in the Northern Hemi-
sphere and inducing a modest hemispheric cooling trend through the 
mid-twentieth century.32  There has not been much of an overall trend 
in aerosol-induced cooling since the 1970s, which has hence ceased to 
mask the greenhouse warming trend.  In the Southern Hemisphere, 
the warming trend due to GHGs has been proceeding since the early 
twentieth century, with an apparent interruption in the 1940s that 
may be an artifact of the paucity of wartime observations.  No other 
combination of natural or anthropogenic factors can explain the ob-
served Northern Hemisphere cooling until the mid-1970s and subse-
quent rapid warming or the observed Southern Hemisphere warming 
since the 1940s. 
The fact that the responses to these different factors are distinct 
allows us to estimate the magnitude of their contributions to recent 
temperature trends without relying on the magnitude of model-
simulated responses.  We do this by what is, in effect, a least-squares fit 
between observations and model simulations.  If there were only a 
single factor that could explain the observed climate change, this 
30 Georgiy Stenchikov et al., Arctic Oscillation Response to Volcanic Eruptions in the 
IPCC AR4 Climate Models,  J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. (ATMOSPHERES), No. D7, Apr. 11, 2006,  
at 15. 
31 Meinrat O. Andreae et al., Strong Present-Day Aerosol Cooling Implies a Hot Future, 
435 NATURE 1187, 1188-89 (2005). 
32 See fig.3, infra. 
  
1370 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 1353 
 
analysis would consist simply of making a scatter plot of observations 
against model simulations and fitting a straight line through the 
points.  In that case, the test of whether that external influence was 
detectable would simply depend on the uncertainty in the slope of the 
line:  if the scatter were consistent (at some confidence level) with a 
line of zero slope, then we would conclude that external influence is 
not detectable (at that confidence level). 
With multiple external drivers contributing to observed climate 
change, the situation is only slightly more complicated.  Instead of fit-
ting a straight line to a two-dimensional scatter plot, we fit a flat sur-
face through a cloud of points, where each “horizontal” dimension of 
the cloud represents the expected response to a different external 
driver and the “vertical” dimension represents the observations.  This 
is easy to visualize if there are only two external drivers considered, so 
the cloud is three-dimensional.  Including more drivers makes the 
problem harder to visualize and tends to increase the uncertainties, 
but the principle is unchanged.  This procedure is illustrated in Fig-
ure 3 using a subset of the models shown in Figure 1 for which simula-
tions of the twentieth century are available.  The effects of the various 
external drivers—specifically, well-mixed GHGs, other anthropogenic 
influences (predominantly sulfate aerosol cooling), and natural influ-
ences (solar and volcanic activity)—are displayed separately.  The left 
panels show observed and model-simulated time series of Northern 
and Southern Hemisphere annual mean surface temperatures plotted 
against time, while the right panels show the same data plotted against 
each other. 
The top panels (a) and (b) show the combined influence of all 
external drivers, as shown in Figure 1(a).  The fit between models and 
data is very good, as illustrated by the tight scatter plot in panel (b), 
resulting in only a small uncertainty in the best-fit line.  Hence we are 
very confident that most of the observed large-scale changes in surface 
temperature over the twentieth century are externally driven.  This 
was a surprising result for many in the climate research community 
when it was first pointed out by Peter A. Stott and his coauthors in 
2000.33  At the time of the first IPCC Scientific Assessment in 1990, for 
example, the prevailing view was that most observed large-scale tem-
perature variability was generated internally by chaotic fluctuations in 
the atmosphere-ocean system, with external drivers making only a 
33 Peter A. Stott et al., External Control of 20th Century Temperature by Natural and An-
thropogenic Forcings, 290 SCIENCE 2133, 2135-36 (2000). 
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small, barely detectable, contribution.34  In fact, it emerges that large-
scale temperature changes on time scales longer than a few years are 
largely controlled by external factors, both anthropogenic and natu-
ral.  This has important implications for the issue of whether harm is 
foreseeable.  The impact of these external drivers on large-scale cli-
mate appears to be much more predictable than the climate research 
community would have expected in the early 1990s. 
Panels (c) and (d) show the influence of the increase in well-
mixed GHGs, with the best fit contributions from the other two fac-
tors—anthropogenic aerosols and natural forcing—removed.  In 
geometric terms, this is equivalent to viewing a four-dimensional scat-
ter plot in which observed temperatures are plotted in the vertical and 
the simulated response to GHGs, anthropogenic aerosols and natural 
drivers are plotted on the other three “horizontal” dimensions from 
an angle at which the contribution of the two non-greenhouse factors 
becomes invisible.  Panels (e) and (f) show the influence of anthro-
pogenic aerosols, and (g) and (h) show the influence of natural fac-
tors and solar and volcanic activity.  In each case, the best-fit line 
through the scatter plots is consistent with the diagonal correspond-
ing to the model response that is equal to the observed response; and 
on the basis of near-surface temperature changes, there is no reason 
to suppose the models are not responding correctly to all three of 
these external drivers. 
There are greater uncertainties about the contributions of indi-
vidual drivers of climate change than about the total change shown in 
the top panel.  This is to be expected, because the main uncertainty in 
our interpretation of recent climatic trends is not in the total change, 
but in how much greenhouse warming may have been masked by 
changes induced by other factors.  Nevertheless, a formal uncertainty 
analysis based on any of these models taken alone or using all of these 
models combined together indicates—as one would intuitively expect 
simply from viewing the scatter plots in Figure 3—that we would be 
very unlikely to have obtained this level of agreement between models 
and data purely by chance.  In the conventional language of detection 
and attribution, the hypotheses of no response to greenhouse, sulfate, 
34 Although the IPCC’s 1990 Assessment reported that the rise in atmospheric 
carbon dioxide concentration “is beyond any doubt due to human activities,” they 
pointedly did not attribute any of the observed temperature rise to human influence at 
that time.  See R.T. Watson et al., Greenhouse Gases and Aerosols, in CLIMATE CHANGE:  
THE IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT 1, 17 ( J .T. Houghton et al. eds., 1990). 
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or natural forcing can all be rejected at a high confidence level—
specifically, with a less than 5% chance that the rejection is in error. 
Our aim here is to convey the basic principles of the climate 
change detection and attribution procedure in order to emphasize its 
fundamental simplicity.  A four-dimensional scatter plot may seem 
rather difficult to visualize, but this is a standard, classical statistical 
procedure, and it is important to stress that there is no simpler way of 
addressing this problem without significantly biasing the outcome.  
This procedure, known as multiple regression, is precisely what is used 
in epidemiological studies in which the confounding influences of 
age, wealth, employment status, and so forth are taken into account 
when quantifying the impact of, for example, smoking on health.35
The basic principle of plotting model simulations against observa-
tions and fitting a straight line or flat plane through the resulting scat-
ter of points is very simple.  The precise method used to estimate the 
slope of the line and uncertainties therein can become quite compli-
cated, but key results do not depend on the methodological details.  It 
is much more important to ensure that the comparison is set up in a 
sensible way that will not automatically introduce bias into the results.  
Highly misleading results can be obtained if inappropriate inputs are 
made to the comparison, as illustrated by Figure 4. 
For example, ostensibly simpler procedures have been used to ar-
gue for a dominant role of solar forcing in recent climate change.  If 
one takes some estimates of past solar output and scales them to 
match observed temperature changes, an impressive fit can be ob-
tained, which appears to leave little room for a substantial human in-
fluence.  The problem with this procedure is that results are heavily 
influenced by the arbitrary decision to consider solar influence before 
anthropogenic causes.  There is no reason to expect that solar influ-
ence over climate is greater than human influence:  if anything, our  
understanding of the physical magnitude of these two drivers points 
to the opposite expectation.  If one were to begin by fitting observed 
temperature changes to estimated human influence, an equally im-
pressive fit, which leaves apparently little room for a substantial solar 
influence, can be obtained.36  The only nonarbitrary way of comparing 
35 See generally Sander Greenland & Kenneth J. Rothman, Measures of Effect and 
Measures of Association, in MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY 47 (Kenneth J. Rothman & Sander 
Greenland eds., 1998) (explaining basic concepts necessary to estimate the effects of 
associations in epidemiological studies). 
36 For a clear and accessible discussion of this long-standing problem, see W.J. In-
gram, Detection and Attribution of Climate Change, and Understanding Solar Influence on 
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the evidence is to consider all candidate explanations simultaneously, 
in a multiple regression. 
A great advantage of framing the problem of climate change de-
tection as a multiple regression is that we can examine the residuals of 
regression—the variations in the observations that are “left over” after 
we have extracted the estimated responses to known climate forc-
ings—to assess whether there is evidence for any “missing forcing.”37  
This is particularly pertinent to the ongoing debates over whether 
land-use changes, particularly urbanization effects, may have contrib-
uted to the apparent warming trend in the observations, and over 
whether (still hypothetical) interactions between solar activity and 
global cloudiness could have contributed to the observed warming.  In 
general, detection and attribution studies have found that regression 
residuals are consistent with what we would expect from internally 
generated climate variability, hence providing no evidence that either 
of these missing forcings is necessary to explain the observations.  
Some studies have found tentative evidence that models underesti-
mate the response to solar forcing, but the discrepancy is too small to 
have a substantial impact on the estimated response to greenhouse 
forcing. 
Detection and attribution studies cannot, of course, entirely ex-
clude the possibility that an unknown missing forcing that happens to 
give a pattern and time history of response very similar to, for exam-
ple, anthropogenic GHG increase might affect their results.  It re-
mains essential, therefore, to continue to explore any such possibility 
for which there is a sound physical basis.  This certainly applies to land 
use changes, which for well-understood reasons are known to have an 
impact on uncorrected local temperature records.38  Considerable ef-
fort has gone into minimizing the impact of urbanization on the ob-
servations shown in Figures 1 and 3 through quality control of the in-
put data.  If urbanization were contributing a substantial fraction of 
the observed warming trend, then various consequences would follow, 
such as differential trends under low and high wind speed conditions.  
Climate, 125 SPACE SCI. REVS. 199, 206-09 (2006). 
37 See generally Allen & Tett, supra note 27 (observing that such a missing forcing 
should be detected as a deficiency in the detection model and that the absence of any 
evidence that the model is deficient therefore provides some (necessarily incomplete) 
reassurance that key forcings have been accounted for). 
38 See, e.g., Richard A. Betts, Biogeophysical Impacts of Land Use on Present-Day Climate:  
Near-Surface Temperature Change and Radiative Forcing, 1 ATMOSPHERIC SCI. LETTERS 
(2001) (explaining that land uses such as deforestation and vegetation affect climate). 
  
1374 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 1353 
 
These consequences are not observed, so it continues to be reason-
able to assume that these data are approximately unbiased.39  Like-
wise, studies of the impact of other potential drivers of global climate 
change, such as “black carbon” (soot) aerosols, have found their 
global impact to be generally much smaller than the impact of in-
creasing GHGs. 
There will always be proponents of a particular climate-forcing 
mechanism prepared to argue that attribution claims should be disre-
garded because their favored mechanism has not, in their view, been 
adequately accounted for.  Without wishing to forestall research into 
these very important questions, it is important that the legal commu-
nity reach agreement on what constitutes an adequate explanation of 
recent climate trends.  Within the scientific community, an explana-
tion that is both physically coherent and consistent with the available 
data—meaning the data that provide no indication that anything is 
missing from either forcings or response—is generally considered 
adequate.  On these terms, the combination of greenhouse warming, 
anthropogenic aerosol cooling, and solar and volcanic activity pro-
vides an adequate explanation of large-scale temperature changes 
over the course of the twentieth century.  Other factors have certainly 
contributed, but based on current evidence their impact appears to be 
relatively small. 
It is interesting to note that critics of recent detection and attribu-
tion studies have focused exclusively on the inputs used—both obser-
vations and model simulations—rather than the attribution methods 
themselves; this is in stark contrast to the debate over reconstructions 
of the climate of the past millennium.40  This probably reflects the 
underlying simplicity of the standard attribution methodology, but it 
is helpful to note that in this area, at least, the science seems to be 
relatively uncontroversial. 
We refer readers to the technical literature, particularly the 2007 
report of the IPCC and the references therein, for the details of such 
formal analyses.41  There are technical issues that need to be resolved 
that are not obvious from Figure 3:  for example, how many effectively 
39 David E. Parker, Large-Scale Warming Is Not Urban, 432 NATURE 290, 290 (2004). 
40 See, e.g., Climate Science:  Roger Pielke Sr. Research Group Weblog, Main Con-
clusions, http://climatesci.colorado.edu/main-conclusions/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2007) 
(arguing that recent climate change reports “have overstated the role of the radiative 
effect of anthropogenic increase of CO2”). 
41 See Hegerl et al., supra note 23.  Note that the report’s “Summary for Policymak-
ers” is available at http://www.ipcc.ch/SPM2feb07.pdf. 
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independent data points do we have and how large a discrepancy 
should we expect between models and data due to internal climate 
variability and uncertainty in the model-simulated responses to differ-
ent drivers of climate change?  These important issues are the subject 
of ongoing research,42 but the strength of the observed signal has en-
abled recent attribution studies to produce robust conclusions.  In 
summary, most of the global warming over the past fifty years is very 
likely to have been due to the observed (anthropogenic) increase in 
GHG levels.43  The warming from the 1920s to the 1940s is most likely 
explained by a combination of increasing solar activity and a tempo-
rary reduction in volcanic activity, possibly augmented by increasing 
GHGs.44  The lack of warming from the 1940s to the 1970s is likely to 
have been caused by compensation between warming induced by in-
creasing GHGs and cooling due to anthropogenic aerosols.45  Gener-
ally, large-scale changes over the twentieth century can be explained 
by current models driven by current best estimates of natural and an-
thropogenic drivers of climate change.  No substantial “missing” forc-
ing, such as land-use changes or exotic sun-climate interactions, is 
needed to explain the observed record.  Quantitative comparison of 
current models with the observed record provides no evidence that 
any models are systematically overestimating the response to increas-
ing GHGs:  in fact, one or two models may be underestimating it.46
We stress that we are simply providing a summary of recent con-
clusions and expressing these conclusions as simply as we can without 
attempting to use the more constrained language of governmental 
and intergovernmental assessments.  The key point is that we are con-
siderably more confident about the causes of climate change over the 
past fifty years than we are about the causes of the early-twentieth-
century warming, or of any change prior to the twentieth century.  
This is partly because of the paucity of Southern Hemisphere observa-
tions in this earlier period and partly because of the irresolvable un-
42 Examples of further study of these issues include Myles R. Allen et al., Quantify-
ing the Uncertainty in Forecasts of Anthropogenic Climate Change, 407 NATURE 617 (2000); 
Gabriele C. Hegerl et al., Effect of Observational Sampling Error on the Detection of Anthropo-
genic Climate Change, 14 J. CLIMATE 198 (2001); and Gabriele C. Hegerl & Myles R. Al-
len, Origins of Model-Data Discrepancies in Optimal Fingerprinting, 15 J. CLIMATE 1348 
(2002). 
43 See generally PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 23, and references therein. 
44 Id. at 10-11. 
45 Id. 
46 See Stott et al., supra note 7, at 3067 fig.9;  PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 
23, § 9.4.1.4 fig.9.9. 
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certainty in the magnitude of external drivers of climate change prior 
to the advent of direct observations. 
Hence, the question of whether most of the warming observed 
over the full twentieth century or since preindustrial times is attribut-
able to human influence is still open to dispute because of the uncer-
tainty in the magnitude of natural influence before 1950.  Neverthe-
less, this does not detract from the fact that we do understand what 
has been causing changes over more recent decades.  This knowledge 
about recent climate change is most relevant to quantifying the im-
pact of GHG emissions to date and to predicting future climate 
change. 
Failure to recognize these (admittedly subtle) distinctions be-
tween attribution of warming over the past fifty, one hundred, or one 
thousand years can lead to considerable energy being wasted on is-
sues, such as the temperature of the Medieval Warm Period, that are 
largely irrelevant to what is happening now and what will happen in 
the next couple of decades.  For example, in the amicus curiae brief 
filed by climate scientists in Massachusetts v. EPA, David Battisti and his 
coauthors posited that “[h]uman activities likely caused most of the 
approximately 0.6oC (1.1oF) rise over the 20th century.” 47  Although 
this statement is supported by the majority of detection and attribu-
tion studies analyzing the causes of climate change over the twentieth 
century, it refers to the full twentieth century rather than the past fifty 
years, and it goes beyond the conclusions of the 2001 IPCC Reports48 
and the U.S. NAS/NRC Report,49 which stated that “the changes ob-
served over the last several decades are likely mostly due to human ac-
tivities.”  In a counter-brief filed in support of the respondents in the 
same case, Sallie Baliunas and other climate scientists argued that Bat-
tisti’s statement is “scientifically wrong” because the origins of the 
early-century warming are still not fully understood and are of compa-
rable magnitude to the more recent warming.50
47 Brief for David Battisti et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 12, Mas-
sachusetts v. EPA, 126 S. Ct. 2960 (2007) (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 2563377. 
48 See generally PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 2, at 695-738 (discussing in 
depth the attribution of causes of climate change). 
49 COMM. ON THE SCI. OF CLIMATE CHANGE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE 
CHANGE SCIENCE:  AN ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY QUESTIONS 1 (2001). 
50 Brief for Sallie Baliunas et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 14, 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 126 S. Ct. 2960 (2007) (No. 05-1120), available at http:// 
www.aei.org/research/nri/publications/pubID.25076,projectID.22/pub_detail.asp. 
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Since current models can, in fact, explain the early-century warm-
ing, whether it was greater or less than the late-century warming is en-
tirely irrelevant to the question of the human contribution to the 
more recent warming.  For instance, if the Krakatoa volcano had hap-
pened to erupt a couple of decades later, further depressing tempera-
tures prior to the 1920-1940 period, we might have seen an even 
greater warming in that period than we have seen since the 1970s, but 
this would not alter either our understanding of what is taking place 
today or our predictions for the coming decades.  But the exchange 
between the climate scientists in Massachusetts v. EPA illustrates the 
importance of meticulous phrasing of attribution statements and 
highlights the importance of focusing on the past half century and not 
being sidetracked into what might or might not have happened ear-
lier.  Notably, although Battisti and his coauthors were eminent cli-
mate scientists, they did not include any of the specialists in quantita-
tive detection and attribution that advised the NAS/NRC and IPCC 
panels.51  This, perhaps, illustrates the increasing specialization of cli-
mate science:  not all climate scientists, however eminent, will neces-
sarily be attuned to the niceties of the attribution question. 
The only question to which the magnitude of the early-century 
and pre-twentieth-century warming periods might be considered rele-
vant is the issue of whether human societies and natural ecosystems 
can or should be expected to cope with climate changes of this magni-
tude.  This is a more subtle question beyond the scope of the attribu-
tion issue that we address in this Article.  We simply draw attention to 
two points.  First, the fact that climatic changes have occurred natu-
rally does not necessarily mean that they were benign.  These past 
natural climate fluctuations may well have caused considerable loss 
and suffering that could be very difficult to quantify with the historical 
records available today.  Second, many prospective plaintiffs will be 
more concerned with the climate they are likely to have to contend 
with over the coming decades rather than with the changes that have 
already occurred.  The key reason the warming trend since the 1970s 
is qualitatively different from, and more damaging than, previous 
natural warming periods is that the trend is expected to be the begin-
51 Brief for David Battisti et al., supra note 47, at 1.  We understand that the inten-
tion of the drafters of the brief was simply to reproduce the IPCC and NAS/NRC 
statements, and that this subtle inconsistency only arose through the editing process, 
so it may seem rather uncharitable to belabor the point, but it does serve to illustrate 
the increasingly technical nature of attribution statements. 
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ning of a sustained change rather than a temporary upturn in global 
temperatures. 
V.  IMPLICATIONS OF PAST ATTRIBUTABLE WARMING 
The relatively tight scatter of the points in panels (c) and (d) of 
Figure 3 indicates that the response to past GHG emissions is known 
to a relatively high degree of certainty.  The models agree with the ob-
servations in that the points fall along the diagonal; in contrast, a 
model that predicted substantially more or less greenhouse warming 
than displayed in Figure 3 would agree significantly less well.  Thus, 
we can be reasonably confident that current models neither overpre-
dict nor underpredict the response to rising GHGs by a substantial 
margin. 
What are the implications?  The warming attributable to GHGs 
over the past fifty years is closely related to the warming predicted, as-
suming (as seems overwhelmingly likely) that the current increase in 
GHG levels continues.  The crucial property of the climate system that 
relates these two periods is the “Transient Climate Response” (TCR), 
which is defined as the warming we should expect at the time of car-
bon dioxide doubling—around year seventy—if carbon dioxide levels 
were to increase at 1% per year, starting with a climate in equilibrium.  
TCR is a theoretical measure of climate system properties that is much 
more relevant to forecasts of change over the coming decades than 
the much more widely known “Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity” (ECS) 
because TCR determines current trends, rather than the long-term 
equilibrium response to a hypothetical stabilization of atmospheric 
GHG levels that may take centuries to materialize.  This is essentially 
because TCR focuses on the dynamical response, and hence takes ac-
count of the thermal inertia of the system, while the equilibrium sensi-
tivity—since it is a long-run, static parameter—does not.  For this very 
reason, the equilibrium sensitivity is not well constrained by recent 
data.52
The reason TCR is closely related to the warming attributable to 
carbon dioxide increase to date is that recent carbon dioxide changes 
are relatively close to an idealized scenario in which carbon dioxide 
levels began to increase from their preindustrial values at 0.45% per 
52 See D.J. Frame et al., Constraining Climate Forecasts:  The Role of Prior Assumptions, 
32 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS, May 6, 2005, at 1 (discussing how “universal consensus 
on long-term equilibrium warming consistent with any given stabilisation level for 
greenhouse gases may prove impossible to achieve”). 
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year beginning around 1935.53  The response to such a compound in-
crease in carbon dioxide scales almost exactly with the rate of in-
crease, so after seventy years of an approximately 0.45% per year in-
crease, we should expect the warming to date attributable to past 
carbon dioxide increase to be approaching half the theoretical TCR.54  
When earlier carbon dioxide increases are also taken into account, 
the total carbon-dioxide-induced warming to date is slightly greater 
than this, or slightly over the warming that should be expected after 
about seventy years of a 0.5% per year increasing carbon dioxide sce-
nario. 
The “warming to date” referred to here is the total warming at-
tributable to past carbon dioxide emissions, meaning the difference 
between today’s expected global temperature and the global tempera-
ture we would expect, ceteris paribus, had this increase not occurred.  
Other measures of attributable warming are also possible, such as the 
warming since 1900 or the linear warming trend over the twentieth 
century.55  All of these are closely related to the total attributable 
warming, so this argument applies to them all, although the conver-
sion factors will be different. 
What actually is estimated in detection and attribution studies is 
the warming due to the observed increase in well-mixed GHGs, in-
cluding the impact of methane, nitrous oxide, and CFCs.  In terms of 
the carbon dioxide concentration that would have the equivalent im-
pact on the global energy budget, this is closer to a 0.6% per year in-
crease beginning in 1940, so—again, allowing for changes prior to 
1940—we can expect the warming to date attributable to past well-
mixed GHGs to be around 70% of the theoretical TCR. 
Hence, because the climate system has already been subjected to a 
ramp-up in carbon dioxide levels very close to that which determines 
TCR, TCR is no longer a purely theoretical, model-based quantity, but 
a property of the world that we can, in principle, observe.  Estimating 
climate system properties from observations must, however, be done 
with care.  In particular, it is necessary to allow for the impact of mul-
tiple natural and anthropogenic influences on the climate system. 
53 See infra fig.4(a). 
54 See infra fig.4(b). 
55 Linear warming trends over the twentieth century have been used as a standard 
measure of attributable change since the publication of Simon F.B. Tett’s article in 
1999.  See Tett et al., supra note 5.  The problem with this measure is that the changes 
we are observing accelerate over the century, so fitting a straight line to them tends to 
understate the magnitude of the change that has actually occurred. 
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A graphic example of the pitfalls of an oversimplistic comparison 
of models with data is given by Figure 5.56  The thin solid lines show 
global temperatures in a number of climate models driven by a 1% 
per year increase in carbon dioxide; the dots show observed tempera-
tures over the past thirty years, and the dashed line shows an extrapo-
lation of a best-fit line through these observed temperatures.  The sci-
entists who created the graph argue that the observed rate of increase 
in carbon dioxide over the thirty-year period was slightly under 0.5% 
per year and that extrapolation of a 0.5% per year rate of increase is 
more credible than a 1% per year scenario because “the change in 
atmospheric concentration shows no evidence for an imminent dou-
bling from its rate for the last three decades.”57  Therefore, they ar-
gued, their extrapolated trend of 1.8oC per century represents a more 
credible forecast of future warming than these model simulations. 
If it were true that a 0.5% per year increase in carbon dioxide 
gives a 1.8oC per century rate of global warming, this would imply that 
all but one of the models shown in Figure 5 are underestimating the 
TCR of the real climate system.  If the real world were to warm by 
1.3oC over eighty years in response to a 0.5% per year carbon dioxide 
increase, as the dashed line in Figure 5 indicates, then we would ex-
pect it to warm by double that amount in response to a 1% per year 
increase.  This would be higher than all but one of the model predic-
tions of the response to this scenario, and that model is no longer in 
use.  Indeed, if this comparison between model simulations and ob-
servations were taken at face value, the fact that the models’ response 
to a 1% carbon dioxide increase appears to match the real world’s re-
sponse to a 0.5% increase over the past thirty years suggests that the 
models are underestimating the true TCR of the climate system by a 
factor of approximately two.58
In fact, such an alarming conclusion is completely unjustified, as is 
the diametrically opposite conclusion that Baliunas and her coauthors 
drew from this figure, which is that current models are currently over-
predicting the real-world response.59  The reason this conclusion is 
56 Figure 5 is reproduced exactly from the Baliunas brief.  See Brief for Baliunas et 
al., supra note 50, at 13 fig.2. 
57 Id. at 12. 
58 We realize that this point has previously been made by Halldor Björnsson.  See 
Posting of Halldor Björnsson to RealClimate, http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/ 
archives/2006/12/further-comment-on-the-supreme-court-briefs/ (Dec. 7, 2006 14:22 
EST). 
59 Brief for Baliunas et al., supra note 50, at 13. 
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unjustified is that this is not a like-for-like comparison between the 
models and observations.  The models in Figure 5 were started from 
equilibrium conditions at the beginning of the experiment, reducing 
their initial warming trends, whereas the real world was already re-
sponding to past GHG emissions by the 1970s.  The models were only 
driven by an increase in carbon dioxide, whereas the real world was 
responding to the combined influence of increasing carbon dioxide, 
other GHGs, anthropogenic aerosols, solar variability, and volcanic ac-
tivity.  Studies that do take into account the influence of these other 
drivers, as well as the time scales of the response and uncertainties 
therein, tend to conclude that most current models simulate ap-
proximately the correct TCR.  These studies typically allow for a TCR 
as high as that indicated by the naïve extrapolation of recent trends 
shown in Figure 5, but typically assign it less than a 10% chance of oc-
currence.60
Systematic comparisons between model simulations and observed 
climate change can be used to constrain climate forecasts, but it is es-
sential to base these on a like-for-like comparison in which models are 
driven by all the principal causes of climate change that are likely to 
have affected the real world.  Such studies must allow for uncertainty 
in the influence of these multiple drivers on past climate trends 
through the use of some kind of multiple regression procedure to 
avoid arbitrarily favoring one driver over another.  They must also al-
low for the fact that carbon dioxide is not the only driver of climate 
change affected by human decisions and that the balance between 
these drivers is likely to change in the future. 
A 1% per year compound increase in carbon dioxide over the 
twenty-first century would give a level of 1000 parts per million (ppm) 
by the year 2100, corresponding to the upper end of the range of in-
creases considered by the IPCC in 2001.  The frequently made asser-
tion61 that climate scenarios typically assume a 1% per year increase is 
not, in fact, correct.  The standard “medium” scenario used by the 
modeling groups contributing to IPCC’s 2007 report, denoted “A1B,” 
leads to the equivalent, when other GHGs are taken into account, of a 
carbon dioxide level of 850 ppm by the year 2100.62  Much lower sce-
narios have also been considered.  The 0.5% per year increase sug-
60 See, e.g., Stott et al., supra note 7, at 3055-69. 
61 Brief for Sallie Baliunas et al., supra note 50, at 11. 
62 For descriptions of the IPCC’s special emissions scenarios, see PHYSICAL SCI-
ENCE BASIS, supra note 23, at 1, 12. 
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gested by Baliunas and her coauthors would lead to slightly over 600 
ppm by the year 2100.  This is slightly lower than the IPCC’s “A1T 
scenario,” which is relatively optimistic about future technological de-
velopment encouraging a rapid shift away from fossil fuels, or its “B2 
scenario,” which is relatively pessimistic about future economic devel-
opment and global economic convergence.  The IPCC projects a 
warming over the twenty-first century of approximately 2oC -3.5oC un-
der these scenarios.63  There are a number of reasons that these fig-
ures are higher than the 1.8oC suggested by Figure 5.  Most impor-
tantly, reduced use of fossil fuels is accompanied by a substantial 
reduction in the sulfur emissions that cause aerosol-induced cooling 
in the A1T scenario, while continued reliance on low-technology food 
production methods causes a substantial increase in methane emis-
sions in the B2 scenario.64
The text of the Baliunas brief implies a much higher level of 
agreement with the mainstream climate modeling community than 
Figure 5 suggests:  in particular, they endorse the prediction of a 
0.5oC -1.0oC warming over the coming fifty years in response to a sus-
tained equivalent of a 0.5% per year increase in carbon dioxide.65  
This corresponds to a range for TCR of 1.5oC -3.0oC, which approxi-
mately spans the 1.3oC-2.6oC range of TCRs of current models used by 
the IPCC.66
There is a surprisingly strong consensus regarding TCR,67 which 
includes authors of both the Battisti and the Baliunas briefs and is po-
tentially very useful for a court in establishing potential liability.  This 
is because the warming attributable to either carbon dioxide or total 
GHG emissions to date is closely related to TCR, as both represent re-
sponses to a driver that is relatively close to the idealized scenario 
upon which TCR is defined.  Carbon-dioxide-induced warming to 
date is equal to approximately half the TCR (hence 0.75oC-1.5oC) 
while total warming due to well-mixed GHGs is 40%-50% higher.  Any 
attempt to quantify the damage done by past carbon dioxide emis-
63 Id. at 13. 
64 Id. at 18. 
65 This prediction was first put forth by James Hansen in 2001.  James E. Hansen & 
Makiko Sato, Trends of Measured Climate Forcing Agents, 98 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF 
THE U.S. 14778, 14,778-83 (2001).  Hansen and his coauthors suggest that this predic-
tion could be achieved by a relatively rapid reduction in methane emissions. 
66 See PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 23, at 723. 
67 D.J. Frame et al., Alternatives to Stabilization Scenarios, 33 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LET-
TERS, July 26, 2006, at L14707-1. 
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sions, either now or over the next couple of decades, will depend, in-
ter alia, on warming to date attributable to carbon dioxide.  The fact 
that we have such a high level of agreement, at least on the lower 
bound, means that the debate on the reality of a carbon-dioxide-
induced warming, comparable in magnitude to the total warming over 
the past fifty years, is essentially over. 
VI.  PROBABILISTIC EVENT ATTRIBUTION:   
ADDRESSING CAUSE AND EFFECT IN A CHAOTIC SYSTEM 
The previous section argued that there is not only strong empiri-
cal evidence, but also a high level of consensus that most if not all of 
the warming observed over the past fifty years is attributable to the an-
thropogenic increase in GHG levels.  Indeed, quantitative estimates 
suggest that the total greenhouse-induced warming may be signifi-
cantly greater than the net observed warming, with a substantial frac-
tion being offset by cooling due to other factors, notably anthropo-
genic aerosols and volcanic activity.  The strength of the evidence for 
human influence on global climate is not, however, likely to be 
enough for a plaintiff to argue that she has suffered, or is likely to suf-
fer, actual harm due to GHG emissions. 
For the purpose of this Article, we will restrict our attention to ac-
tual harms due to past or present injury or loss and immediate poten-
tial harms, by which we mean harms which may manifest themselves 
within the next decade or two.  The reason for this focus is that quan-
tifying this class of harm depends on understanding present-day cli-
mate and current climate trends.  Crucially, it does not depend on fu-
ture carbon dioxide emission rates, which depend on decisions 
outside the control of any conceivable class of defendants, making 
them highly contentious.  The reason is simple:  the climate responds 
to the current level of carbon dioxide, not its rate of increase, so any 
foreseeable change in the carbon dioxide emission rate will take at 
least a couple of decades to have a significant impact on climate.  We 
can safely consider the climate of the current quarter century to be a 
result of natural factors (some of which may happen in the future, 
such as a volcanic eruption in the next few years) and human deci-
sions that have already been made.  Although we will continue to ex-
perience climate change over this period, decisions made now or in 
the future are unlikely to have much impact on climate prior to 2025. 
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The importance of this restriction is again illustrated by the amici 
curiae exchange cited above.68  Baliunas et al. argue that the warming 
expected by the year 2100 under their proposed 0.5%-per-year sce-
nario for the increase of carbon dioxide (which, starting from today’s 
levels, would lead to levels reaching approximately 600 ppm by 2100) 
would be lower than the warming expected under, for example, the 
IPCC A1B “medium” scenario in which GHG levels reach 850 ppm 
carbon dioxide by 2100.69  This may be so, but it is entirely irrelevant 
to the climate of the next couple of decades because a small accelera-
tion in the rate of carbon dioxide increase, as predicted by the IPCC 
in response to rising emissions, would take at least twenty years to have 
any discernible impact on climate.70  Hence, if a court were to decide 
that it is interested solely in impacts over the current quarter century, 
it would not need to concern itself with the details of future emissions 
scenarios and their associated assumptions of global population and 
economic growth, technological development, and so forth.  This 
would avoid a vast and highly contentious area of debate. 
This restriction is not intended to downplay the importance of 
more distant impacts of climate change nor to presume that these are 
not the proper concern of the courts.  Our point is simply that the 
science required to support or contest claims about the likelihood, for 
example, of a massive sea level rise due to the collapse of the 
Greenland Ice Sheet in the twenty-second century is very different 
from the science required to evaluate claims about much more mun-
dane issues like increased drought, storm, or flood risk today. 
The key difference between long-term, catastrophic impacts of 
GHG increases and more mundane short-term impacts is that we 
might, in some instances, be able to say with confidence that some of 
these long-term impacts would not have occurred in the absence of 
human influence on climate.  Our descendants might, in the twenty-
second century, be in a position to say that the Greenland Ice Sheet 
would have been preserved if we had not interfered with the climate, 
and could straightforwardly attribute a catastrophic decline in ice vol-
ume to elevated GHG levels.  Our current understanding of present 
68 See supra notes 47 & 50. 
69 See Brief for Baliunas et al., supra note 50, at 11, 12 n.10 (arguing that computer 
models using a 1% per year carbon dioxide increase are likely to overstate global 
warming by a factor of two); PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 23, at 12 (outlining 
the IPCC scenarios). 
70 See, e.g., Peter A. Stott & J.A. Kettleborough, Origins and Estimates of Uncertainty in 
Predictions of Twenty-First Century Temperature Rise, 416 NATURE 723, 725 (2002). 
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climate trends, however, suggests that we are unlikely to see specific 
events that simply could not have occurred in the absence of human 
influence on climate within the next couple of decades.  Local tem-
perature records continue to be broken every year, but this simply 
means that the temperature in question has reached a level not seen 
for a hundred years (or whenever that record began).  It does not 
mean that human influence is necessarily to blame, since natural cli-
mate fluctuations can also cause weather records to be broken.  Most 
of the damage attributable to climate change on this time scale is 
likely to be due to events, such as floods and heat waves, which might 
have occurred naturally, but which have been made more likely by 
human influence on climate.  Thus, although focusing on this shorter 
time scale simplifies our task, in that we do not have to consider fu-
ture emission scenarios, it does mean we have to take a more sophisti-
cated approach to attribution than the simple but-for test that might 
be applicable to the Greenland Ice Sheet problem. 
It is still widely assumed, even in scientific circles, that if an event 
might have occurred naturally, it cannot be attributed to climate 
change, and hence that the most that can be said is something along 
the lines of “this is the kind of event that we might expect to become 
more frequent under climate change.”  We believe a quantitative ap-
proach to causal attribution is possible, but it needs to be framed in a 
probabilistic framework.  Some of the authors of this Article have 
proposed an approach to this problem that we will refer to as “prob-
abilistic event attribution,” which focuses on attributing changes in 
the risk of an event occurring to external drivers of climate rather 
than attempting to dissect the event itself.71  If we are talking about a 
global temperature trend, it makes sense to say that x% of the trend is 
attributable to carbon dioxide increase, y% to other GHGs, and so 
on.  If a flash flood occurs due to heavy rain, it makes no sense to say 
that this many millimeters of rain were due to factor A while this many 
millimeters were due to factor B.  In a chaotic system, events are self-
reinforcing, so the various external drivers of weather do not simply 
add different amounts of rain.  We have to consider the weather sys-
tem that occurred as a single, indivisible event and ask how various 
causal factors may have contributed to the risk of such an event occur-
ring. 
71 Myles Allen, Liability for Climate Change, 421 NATURE 891, 891-92 (2003); Dáithí 
A. Stone & Myles R. Allen, The End-to-End Attribution Problem:  From Emissions to Impacts, 
71 CLIMATIC CHANGE 303, 303-04 (2005). 
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The simplest analogy is with a loaded die.  If a die is loaded to 
double the odds on a six, and it comes up six, then there is a clear 
sense in which some of the risk of that six occurring can be attributed 
to the loading.  It makes no sense to say that three of the six dots on 
the face of the die are due to the loading, and three are due to 
chance, but this is what we would be doing if we were to try to dissect a 
weather event into a component due to human influence and a com-
ponent due to natural variability.72
The die example is simplified by the fact that rolling a die is a dis-
crete event and, provided it is rolled properly, nothing apart from the 
loading has any detectable impact on the odds of the die coming up 
six.  In the case of weather, we have to deal with ambiguity in when 
exactly a weather event begins and ends, and the fact that many fac-
tors will have contributed to the sequence of events that led up to it.  
This complicates the definition of what we mean by “the risk of an 
event”:  do we mean the probability of that event occurring given the 
information available the day before it occurred, or the month before, 
or the year before?  This issue matters considerably for quantifying ex-
ternal contributions to risk:  the odds of a storm tomorrow are almost 
completely determined by the state of the weather today, with almost 
no role for external influences like elevated GHG levels. 
If a die rolls forever, can we coherently talk about the influence of 
loading on the odds of a particular outcome?  Fortunately, because of 
the highly chaotic nature of weather, the die does not roll forever, in 
that the impact of these precursor events becomes completely unpre-
dictable after a relatively short time.  Most mid-latitude variability dis-
plays predictability time scales of only a few days.  The most predict-
able phenomenon to have a substantial impact on global weather is 
probably El Niño, which is only predictable a year or so in advance.  
The quest for longer-term predictions continues, but so far, despite 
decades of searching, predictable phenomena on time scales beyond a 
few months account for only a small fraction of the changes in the 
weather variables that tend to affect people’s lives.  (Most predictabil-
ity resides, for example, in the deep oceans.)  This is particularly true 
once variations due to external factors are taken into account.  Hence, 
we could argue that the roll of the weather die that resulted in a par-
ticular flood began at most a year or two before the flood occurred:  
72 We do not wish to belabor this point more than is necessary, but this seems to 
be a common source of confusion among nonspecialists. 
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the state of the atmosphere and ocean prior to that time will have had 
only a negligible impact on the odds of the flood occurring. 
In the context of probabilistic event attribution, we define the risk 
of an event as the probability of that event occurring in an atmos-
phere-ocean system identical to our own, driven by the same external 
drivers (natural and anthropogenic), and subject to a small perturba-
tion far enough in advance of the event that further advancing it has 
no impact on the odds of the event occurring.  With a rigorous defini-
tion of the risk of an event, we can then ask counterfactual questions 
about how that risk might change if a particular driver of climate 
change, such as past GHG emissions, had not occurred. 
Crucially, such questions can only be addressed through com-
puter simulation.  Every sequence of meteorological events is effec-
tively unprecedented, and the events that cause damage are, almost by 
definition, exceptional, so there is little scope for examining the his-
torical record to determine empirically how external factors affect 
their risk of occurrence.  The point is frequently made in the debate 
over human influence on extreme weather risk that the period of 
human influence remains too short to detect any significant trend in 
event frequency.  This may well be true for many classes of extreme 
weather events, but it misses the point that risks may nevertheless be 
changing, even though we cannot rely merely on observation to quan-
tify the magnitude of that change.  Through computer simulation, we 
combine our observations with physical understanding of what is tak-
ing place. 
If we had a perfect simulation model of the climate system and 
complete knowledge of how external drivers have varied since prein-
dustrial times, then the problem of assessing the contribution of hu-
man influence on climate to the probability of occurrence of a par-
ticular weather event would be straightforward.  We would simply 
perform two “ensemble” experiments, each comprising multiple runs 
of our simulation model in which initial conditions are disturbed to 
yield an independent trajectory through the chaotic atmosphere-
ocean system.  The requirement of independence means, in effect, 
that simulations are started far enough in advance of the season in 
which the event occurred for their starting conditions to have only a 
negligible impact on the odds of the event occurring in any member 
of the ensemble.  There can be no hard and fast rule about how far in 
advance this needs to be (because it will be affected by the nature of 
the event under investigation), but it is straightforward to test whether 
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the simulations are long enough simply by varying the start date and 
examining whether it has any significant impact on results. 
One ensemble would include, and the other would exclude, a 
specific human influence, such as elevated GHG levels, allowing us to 
compare the probability of, say, summer temperatures in 2003 exceed-
ing a particular threshold between the two ensembles.  Suppose P1 is 
the probability of the threshold being exceeded in our simulated pre-
sent day climate, and P0 is the corresponding probability in a climate 
with human influence removed.  Then the so-called Fraction Attribut-
able Risk (FAR = 1 – (P0/P1)) is a measure of the proportion of current 
risk that can be attributed to human influence.73
Even before we introduce scientific uncertainty, a decision needs 
to be made about how to treat other drivers of climate change.  Under 
the interpretation of ceteris paribus suggested above, the relevant 
comparison is between present-day risk and risk in a climate in which 
external factors (like volcanic eruptions), with the sole exception of 
human influence, evolve exactly as they have up until now.  This 
seems to be the most natural line to take, and also that which is most 
consistent with epidemiological practice.  If a smoker exercises regu-
larly, then the contribution of smoking to her risk of high blood pres-
sure is generally assessed relative to non-smokers who take a similar 
level of exercise, rather than relative to the population as a whole.  
Hence, in our view, the fact that a volcano might have gone off in 
2002, significantly reducing the risk of the 2003 European heat wave, 
is immaterial:  no such volcano erupted. 
No climate model is perfect now, nor will one ever be, so it is es-
sential to have a methodology for attributing risk that is applicable to 
imperfect simulation models.  In principle, the approach we can take 
is very simple.  Instead of a single pair of ensembles, with and without 
human influence on climate, we can generate many pairs of ensem-
bles from a range of possible models, with each model weighted by its 
relative likelihood of providing an accurate representation of the vari-
able in question. 
Let us consider a specific example.  The summer of 2003 brought 
sustained, exceptionally high temperatures to large areas of Europe, 
with some regions of France experiencing average temperatures over 
10oC higher than the average for 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2004, over the 
first twenty days of August.  This heat wave, and the accompanying 
drought, are estimated to have caused over $10 billion in continent-
73 Stone & Allen, supra note 71, at 305. 
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wide agricultural losses, almost entirely uninsured, and over $1.6 bil-
lion in losses from forest fires, primarily in Portugal.74  Even more se-
riously, the heat wave has been blamed for up to 35,000 excess deaths 
across the continent, most of which occurred during the most intense 
period in early August.75
In a 2004 article,76 we explored the extent to which this heat wave 
could be attributed to human influence on climate using this prob-
abilistic event attribution framework.  We focused on the statistics of 
three-month-averaged ( June, July, and August) temperature anoma-
lies over a large area of southern Europe that had previously been 
identified as a climatically coherent region.77  Standard definitions of 
“summer” (June through August standard conditions) and “Southern 
Europe”78 were used, even though the heat wave itself was most in-
tense in much smaller regions and over a shorter time (the first two 
weeks of August).  This was done because, if the definition of the 
threshold used to define a particular extreme event is tailored too 
closely to the details of the event that actually occurred, we will inevi-
tably find that every event appears to be highly improbable.  Given suf-
ficient detail, every meteorological situation is unprecedented.  For 
the same reason, we defined a heat wave event as an area-averaged 
and seasonally-averaged temperature anomaly exceeding a threshold 
of 1.6oC above the average for 1961-1990, even though the actual tem-
perature anomaly in 2003 was 2.3oC, since 1.6oC would exceed the 
temperature of the previous warmest summer on record—2001.  
Avoiding this so-called “selection bias” requires that the definition of 
the threshold should be independent of what actually occurred, or 
there should be a natural selection threshold before the event takes 
place.  While it is plausible that we might have posed the question, 
“What are the chances of a record-breaking heat wave this summer?” 
early in 2003, it is less plausible that we would have specifically asked, 
“What are the chances of temperature anomalies exceeding 2.2oC?” 
74 Emily Black et al., Factors Contributing to the Summer 2003 European Heatwave, 59 
WEATHER 217, 217-23 (2004); Christoph Schär & Gerd Jendritzky, Hot News from Sum-
mer 2003, 432 NATURE 559, 559 box 1 (2004). 
75 Schär and Jendritzky, supra note 74, at 559 box 1. 
76 Peter A. Stott, D.A. Stone & M.R. Allen, Human Contribution to the European Heat-
wave of 2003, 432 NATURE 610 (2004). 
77 Id. at 610. 
78 The region used was one of the “climatically coherent” regions technically de-
fined as “Mediterranean” by F. Giorgi & L.O. Mearns, Probability of Regional Climate 
Change Based on the Reliability Ensemble Averaging (REA) Method, 30 GEOPHYSICAL RES. 
LETTERS, June 24, 2003, at 31-3. 
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It would be of considerable interest for future attribution studies 
if an effort were made now to catalogue and define damaging weather 
events whose likelihood might be affected by human influence on 
climate before they actually occur.  In many cases, risks are relatively 
well known from catastrophic loss modeling in the insurance industry, 
which also has considerable experience in precise specification of 
what an event (such as a hurricane of Category 4 or greater striking a 
major Gulf Coast city) exactly entails.  It would be a major undertak-
ing to draw all this information together.  However, doing so would 
significantly simplify and potentially strengthen future attribution 
claims.  If an event is predefined and then it occurs, we completely 
avoid the problem of assessing how much our attribution results may 
be biased by the possibility that we may be tailoring our definition of 
the event to the knowledge of what actually occurred. 
The statistics on summer temperature variability about the ex-
pected “background” level were found to be simulated adequately by 
the climate model used, and were found to conform to a standard 
model for the behavior of extreme values, displaying no evidence of 
changing systematically over time.79  This last condition allowed a very 
significant simplification of the problem because it meant that the 
impact of human influence on the risk of summer temperatures ex-
ceeding a particular threshold is simply determined by the character-
istics of this distribution and the human impact on expected summer 
temperatures.  The impact of any external driver on expected summer 
temperatures is straightforward to define because of the deterministic, 
predictable relationship between external drivers and climate. 
We obtained a range of magnitudes for human influence on 
European summer climate using precisely the multiple regression ap-
proach described above:  in effect, scaling the response to anthropo-
genic drivers up and down until the scaled version of the model was 
no longer consistent with observations of European summer tempera-
tures over the twentieth century.  This scaling approach provides a 
method of synthesizing a set of possible models without explicitly 
running them.  It is justified by the observation that temperature re-
sponses to external drivers differ between models primarily in magni-
tude and much less in the temporal evolution or spatial pattern of the 
79 This condition is unlikely to be satisfied on smaller scales to those considered in 
the Stott et al. study.  See, e.g., Christoph Schär et al., The Role of Increasing Temperature 
Variability in European Summer Heatwaves, 427 NATURE 332 (2004); Sonia I. Seneviratne 
et al., Land-Atmosphere Coupling and Climate Change in Europe, 443 NATURE 205 (2006). 
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response, something that is less true for other variables like precipita-
tion.80  At the same time, uncertainty in the response to natural driv-
ers, including fluctuations in solar and volcanic activity, was taken into 
account using a similar approach:  scaling the model-simulated re-
sponse to these other drivers up and down and allowing the scaling 
factor to vary along with the scaling on the anthropogenic response.  
This approach indicates an anthropogenic summer warming of 
around 0.5oC ± 0.2oC, with relatively little warming due to natural in-
fluences. 
Given that year-to-year variability about this expected summer 
temperature appears to be stationary, computing the possible impact 
of such an uncertain change in expected mean temperatures on the 
probability of a given temperature threshold being exceeded is 
straightforward.  We simply subtracted possible values of the anthro-
pogenic summer warming from a simulation of late-twentieth-century 
conditions with all external drivers imposed to simulate a set of possi-
ble models with a range of different responses to anthropogenic in-
fluence.  Crucially, this approach assumes that, before any comparison 
is made with observations, all values of anthropogenic or natural 
warming are equally likely, so that there is an equal chance of green-
house-induced cooling or warming.  Although such an outcome is 
highly unlikely on physical grounds, it is here ruled out by the record 
of observed summer temperatures, not by any model simulation.  The 
model is used to provide an estimate of the spatial and temporal form 
of the response, not its magnitude or sign. 
Having synthesized distributions of summer temperatures with 
and without anthropogenic influence for a range of “possible models” 
of varying degrees of likelihood, we can then compute the risk of 
summer temperatures exceeding any given threshold.  Results are 
shown in Figure 6.  The fuzzy line labeled “With human influence” 
shows how the “return period” (the inverse of the odds of an event 
occurring in a particular year) for summer regionally- and seasonally-
averaged temperatures exceeding a particular threshold varies with 
80 See generally H. Douville, Detection-Attribution of Global Warming at the Regional 
Scale:  How To Deal with Precipitation Variability?, 33 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS, Jan. 17, 
2006, at L02701-1 (discussing the effect of the “natural variability of precipitation” on 
our ability to attribute changes in surface temperature to human activity); Gabriele C. 
Hegerl et al., Detectability of Anthropogenic Changes in Annual Temperature and Precipitation 
Extremes, 17 J. CLIMATE 3683, 3689-90 (2004); F. Hugo Lambert et al., Attribution Studies 
of Observed Land Precipitation Changes with Nine Coupled Models, 32 GEOPHYSICAL RES. 
LETTERS, Sep. 21, 2005, at L18704-1 (noting that precipitation is subject to greater 
variability than temperature). 
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the threshold considered assuming key external drivers of climate 
change take values similar to those that obtained in 2003.  On this 
analysis, temperature exceeding the 1.6oC threshold was approxi-
mately a one-in-one-hundred-year event, or, rather, there was only a 
1% chance of it happening in that particular year.  The spread or the 
fuzziness of the line is an indication of the uncertainty in what the re-
turn time of this event actually was. 
The fuzzy line labeled as “Without human interference” shows 
how the return period varies with threshold, assuming the impact of 
human influence has been removed and all other factors are held 
near 2003 values.  In the absence of human influence, temperatures 
exceeding the 1.6oC threshold would have been closer to a one-in-one-
thousand year event, so the impact of human influence has been to 
increase the risk of such an event occurring by a factor of four to ten.  
Note that in the 2004 article,81 the statistics of these extremes were 
modeled with a Gaussian distribution, giving a more conservative 
(smaller) estimate of the increase in risk.  We believe it is both more 
realistic and consistent with standard practice to model these distribu-
tions with an extreme value distribution.82  With the limited sample of 
model simulations available (and even more limited observations), we 
cannot distinguish between different representations, so it is appro-
priate to use the most flexible representation, which is the generalized 
extreme value distribution. 
The fact that these return period plots are straight lines on a log 
scale is a simple consequence of the shape of the exponential tail of 
the extreme value distributions used.  This would also apply to a broad 
range of other distributions.  The fact that these lines are parallel is a 
consequence of our assumption that the impact of human influence is 
to shift the mean of the distribution without significantly altering its 
shape.  This would not necessarily be the case in a more complex 
problem.83  But in this case it clearly simplifies matters, because the 
ratio P0 /P1 which determines FAR is independent of the threshold 
used or possible modeling errors that might shift the distributions up 
or down.  Since the absolute value of the return period for an event 
will always be poorly known, this is a very useful property. 
81 Stott, Stone, & Allen, supra note 76, at 612. 
82 See STUART COLES, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICAL MODELING OF EXTREME 
VALUES 105-23 (2001) (providing a general introduction to modeling extreme-value 
distributions). 
83 For example, it would probably not be the case for temperature extremes on 
smaller scales. 
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This analysis indicates that the most likely value for the fraction of 
risk attributable to past human influence on climate is around 0.85—
or, equivalently, that the overall summer warming caused by past hu-
man influence on climate has increased the risk of summer tempera-
tures exceeding the 1.6oC threshold by over a factor of six.  There is, 
however, a high level of uncertainty in this estimate of FAR, as indi-
cated by the spread of the fuzzy distributions in Figure 6.  Most of this 
spread arises from uncertainty in the size of human influence on ex-
pected European summer temperatures, with some contribution from 
uncertainty in the estimated parameters of the statistical model used 
to infer the probability of rare events from a limited ensemble.  Aver-
aging over possible models, weighted by their relative likelihood, indi-
cates a mean likelihood-weighted FAR of 0.75, while an FAR of less 
than 0.5 can be ruled out as unlikely at the 10% level.  Hence, the 
2004 article concluded that it is very likely that human influence on 
climate increased the risk of the 2003 heat wave by a factor of at least 
two, with the most likely increase in risk considerably greater than 
two.84
It is important to reemphasize that the conclusions of the 2004 ar-
ticle pertained to large-area seasonally averaged temperatures,85 which 
are still relatively far removed from the scale of the extreme weather 
events that caused the bulk of the damage over the heat wave.  In 
principle, extending the analysis to smaller spatial scales and shorter 
time scales is quite feasible.  The essential question is the same:  how 
does the probability of this event differ between an ensemble simula-
tion of present-day climate and an equivalent simulation excluding 
past human influence, allowing for uncertainty in the formulation of 
the simulation model by averaging over possible models weighted by 
some measure of their relative likelihood?  The assumptions used to 
address this question would, however, need to change.  In particular, 
the influence on nonlinear feedbacks on smaller scales would rule out 
the assumption of stationary variability about a changing background 
climate, necessitating explicit simulation with ensembles of higher 
resolution models. 
Despite these caveats, the conclusions of the 2004 article are of in-
terest in that the overall estimate for attributable risk is not inconsis-
tent with the possibility of liability.  David A. Grossman argues that, in 
the context of United States tort law, “plaintiffs . . . must show that, 
84 Stott et al., supra note 76, at 612-13. 
85 Id. at 611. 
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more probably than not, their individual injuries were caused by the 
risk factor in question, as opposed to any other cause.  This has some-
times been translated to a requirement of a relative risk of at least 
two.”86  If the risk factor in question were human influence on area-
averaged summer temperatures in southern Europe in 2003, it would 
appear that this threshold has already been passed. 
VII.  OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS FOR THE LEGAL COMMUNITY 
We conclude this review by reiterating a range of questions that 
we would like to encourage the legal community to consider.  These 
are not scientific questions, but they bear on the nature of the science 
required to support any causal attribution of harm to human influ-
ence on climate and may, in some cases, determine whether such sci-
ence is even possible. 
First, what is “natural” climate?  In quantifying the extent of hu-
man influence on climate- and weather-related risks, what is the ap-
propriate reference climate?  Is it a “preindustrial” climate?  If so, 
which preindustrial climate?  Is it relevant that natural factors might—
had things like the timing of volcanic eruptions evolved differently— 
have caused a warming as large as that observed over the past half cen-
tury?  Or is the relevant reference climate simply the climate that 
would have occurred in the present day, all other things being equal, 
in the absence of human influence?  As a scientific community, we 
hope that the legal community can be satisfied with the second op-
tion, even though it can only be explored through computer simula-
tion, because the problem of characterizing the “climate that might 
have been” if we had not interfered with it is considerably better 
posed than the problem of characterizing preindustrial climate, as 
evidenced by the “Hockey Stick” debate over reconstructions of the 
climate of the last millennium. 
Second, are we primarily interested in impacts in the current 
quarter century, or over longer time scales?  The advantage of focus-
ing on the current quarter century is that impacts on this time scale 
are unlikely to be affected by current or future decisions regarding 
carbon dioxide emissions (although they may be affected by other 
human and natural influences on climate).  This simplifies the attri-
bution of responsibility for impacts but, of course, makes it difficult to 
86 David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea:  Tort-Based Climate 
Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 23 (2003) (footnote omitted). 
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design effective measures of injunctive relief.  The disadvantage from 
an attribution perspective is that few impacts on this time scale will be 
events that could not have occurred in the absence of human influ-
ence, making some form of probabilistic approach to attribution es-
sential. 
Third, if we are concerned with long-term future impacts, how 
should we deal with uncertainty in future emissions?  The exchange 
between the amici curiae87 in Massachusetts v. EPA illustrates that it is 
possible to argue over likely future emission rates and consequent 
carbon dioxide levels more or less indefinitely.  Most of the factors on 
which these emission rates depend, such as future global population 
trends or the economic performance of large developing nations, 
would lie outside the control of most prospective defendants, compli-
cating any link between defendants’ decisions and future climate im-
pacts. 
Fourth, if we are concerned with current or near-term future im-
pacts, most will be due to extreme weather events that might have oc-
curred naturally, but whose risk of occurrence may have been in-
creased by climate change.  Can we treat changing risks as if they are 
real quantities, despite the fact that these risks must be estimated from 
computer simulations that cannot, because we only have a single reali-
zation of the observed record, be directly validated against observa-
tions? 
Finally, if we are prepared to base an assessment of liability in 
terms of attributable changes in risk, is the overall approach to quanti-
fying Fraction Attributable Risk described above88 the best way to go 
forward?  It was developed within the scientific community with refer-
ence to the epidemiological literature, but with no particular regard 
to the needs of the legal community, so there is no reason to suppose 
it is the optimal approach. 
As we stressed at the outset of this Article, if these questions can 
be resolved, it is to be hoped that attribution scientists can then play a 
relatively noncontentious, mundane, and technical role in forthcom-
ing cases in which the attribution of harm to human influence on cli-
mate is an issue.  This would allow the courts to focus on other mat-
ters such as standing and negligence that are closer to their traditional 
remit, and would also avoid polarizing the scientific community any 
further than it is already. 
87 See supra notes 47 & 50. 
88 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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APPENDIX 
Figure 1 
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Figure 1:  (a) Observed global temperatures over 1901-2005 from near-
surface temperature observations (thick black line) and as simulated by a range 
of climate models driven by the combination of increasing GHGs, changes in 
anthropogenic aerosols, solar variability, and volcanic activity (thin gray 
lines).  Average of model simulations shown as thick grey line. (b) Same as in 
(a), but removing the impact of human influence from the model simulations. 
 
Figure 289
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 2:  Reconstructions of Northern Hemisphere temperatures over the 
past millennium from “proxy” observations (primarily tree-ring records) from 
various sources (grey bands, thin lines, and dotted lines), compared with in-
strumental observations (thick black line) and a simulation using a simple 
 
89 Hegerl et al., supra note 22, at 1029 fig.1.  Figure reproduced with permission.  
Monochrome version kindly provided by G. Hegerl. 
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climate model (thick grey solid line) driven by the combination of natural and 
anthropogenic forcings. 
Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  A simple attribution analysis, comparing model simulations 
with observed temperature changes over the twentieth century.  (a) Grey dots:  
Observed Northern and Southern Hemisphere area-averaged near-surface tem-
perature anomalies during the period 1901-2005 relative to average tempera-
tures between 1900-1940.  Grayscale indicates time, with lighter being more re-
cent.  Black lines:  Corresponding simulated temperatures from six of the 
models shown in Figure 1 driven by the combination of GHG increase, anthro-
pogenic sulfate aerosols, and natural (solar and volcanic) variability.  South-
ern Hemisphere points are offset by 1oC.  (b) Same data, plotting model simula-
tions (horizontal) against observations (vertical).  Grayscale indicates time, as 
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in panel (a).  (c) Grey dots:  Observed temperature anomalies after removing 
the best-fit contribution from sulfate and natural forcing.  Best-fit is obtained 
from a three-way, least-squares multiple linear regression between the observa-
tions and model-simulated responses to GHGs, sulfate, and natural forcing, 
obtained from simulations in which drivers are prescribed separately (ensemble 
means smoothed with a five-point running mean).  Black lines:  Simulated 
temperatures from three models driven by GHGs alone.  (d) Simulated green-
house response versus observed temperatures after removing best-fit sulfate and 
natural contributions.  Regression fits are obtained for the models separately, 
hence allowing the models to make different errors in the magnitudes of their 
responses.  Fitted points are plotted separately in panel (d) and averaged to-
gether before being removed from the observation in panel (c).  (e) and (f):  
same as in (c) and (d), but showing the response to anthropogenic sulfates.  (g) 
and (h):  the response to natural (solar and volcanic) variability.   Formal un-
certainty analysis of regression slopes requires a more sophisticated treatment.  
The aim of this Figure is simply to illustrate the strength of the greenhouse sig-
nal over the aerosol and natural contributions (which, although weaker, are 
still detectable).  The fact that the dots in panel (d) lie along the leading diago-
nal indicates that these models are neither overestimating nor underestimating 
the response to GHG increase. 
Figure 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  (a) A comparison of observed carbon dioxide increase since 1750 
with an idealized scenario in which carbon dioxide levels increase at 0.45% 
per year for seventy years from 1935-2005.  Note that carbon dioxide levels 
since the 1970s are very similar between the real and idealized scenarios.  (b) A 
comparison of the response of a simple climate model to both observed carbon 
dioxide increases (solid line) and the idealized scenario (dashed line).  By the 
year 2000, carbon-dioxide-induced warming is very close to what is expected 
under this idealized scenario, the impact of the earlier “ramp-up” having dissi-
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pated.  Hence, estimates of carbon-dioxide-induced warming to date are very 
close to half the theoretical Transient Climate Response. 
Figure 590
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5:  An oversimplistic comparison of models with data.  Observed 
near-surface temperature anomalies 1975-2005 (dots) plotted against model-
simulated responses to an imposed 1% per year increase in carbon dioxide 
(thin lines).  Thick line is the mean model-simulated response and thick dashed 
line shows an extrapolated trend fitted to these observations.  The agreement 
between the models driven by a 1% per year increase and the observations, 
driven by an average of slightly under 0.5% per year over this period, is coin-
cidental and should not be taken to imply that the models are systematically 
underestimating the response to a given rate of carbon dioxide increase. 
 
 
 
 
 
90 Brief for Baliunas et al., supra note 50, at 13 fig.2. 
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Figure 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6:  Change in risk of European summer temperature anomalies ex-
ceeding a range of temperature thresholds.  The thick line labeled “With human 
influence” shows the best estimate of the risk under present-day conditions, with 
dotted lines showing the range of uncertainty in these return periods.  The thick 
line labeled “Without human influence” shows the best estimate of the risk un-
der conditions similar to the present day except with human influence (the im-
pact of increased GHG levels and sulfate aerosols) removed, with dotted lines 
showing the range of uncertainty. 
 
